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ABSTRACT
We offer an explanation for the forward premium puzzle in foreign exchange markets based upon
investor overconfidence. In the model, overconfident individuals overreact to their information about
future inflation, which causes greater overshooting in the forward rate than in the spot rate. Thus, when
agents observe a signal of higher future inflation, the consequent rise in the forward premium predicts
a subsequent downward correction of the spot rate. The model can explain the magnitude of the forward
premium bias and several other stylized facts related to the joint behavior of forward and spot exchange










McCombs School of Business
University of Texas at Austin




Merage School of Business
University of California, Irvine
Irvine, CA  92697
david.h@uci.edu
Tracy Yue Wang
Carlson School of Management
University of Minnesota
321 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
wangx684@umn.edu1 Introduction
Nominal interest rates re￿ ect investor expectations about future in￿ ation. If investors ra-
tionally forecast in￿ ation, then (assuming perfect markets and risk-neutrality) currencies in
which bonds o⁄er high nominal interest rates should on average depreciate relative to low-
nominal-interest-rate currencies.A strong empirical ￿nding, however, is that at times when
short-term nominal interest rates are high in one currency relative to another, that currency
subsequently appreciates on average (see, e.g., surveys of Hodrick 1987, Lewis 1995, and
Engel 1996). An equivalent ￿nding is that the forward premium (de￿ned as the di⁄erence
between the forward and spot exchange rates) negatively forecasts subsequent exchange rate
changes, a pattern known as the forward premium puzzle.1
The most extensively explored explanation for the forward premium puzzle is that it
re￿ ects time-varying rational premia for systematic risk (e.g., Fama 1984). However, the
survey of Hodrick (1987) concludes that ￿we do not yet have a model of expected returns
that ￿ts the data￿in foreign exchange markets; Engel (1996) similarly concludes that models
of equilibrium risk premia do not explain the strong negative relation between the forward
premium and the future exchange rate change for any degree of risk aversion, even when
nonstandard utility functions are employed.2 He therefore suggests that an approach based
upon imperfect rationality can potentially o⁄er new insights into the puzzle.
We propose an explanation for the forward premium puzzle based upon investor overcon-
￿dence about the precision of their information and beliefs. This form of overcon￿dence (also
known as judgmental or calibration overcon￿dence) has been documented in many studies
in the psychology of judgment and in experimental market studies (see, e.g., the surveys
of DeBondt and Thaler, 1995; Rabin, 1998; and Gri¢ n and Brenner, 2004).3 Empirically,
1The average slope coe¢ cient in regressions of future changes in the log spot exchange rate on the forward
premium across some 75 published estimates surveyed by Froot and Thaler (1990) is ￿0:88.
2For example, Bekaert (1996) ￿nds that his habit formation model would require unrealistically volatile
exchange rates to deliver exchange rate risk premia that are variable enough to explain the forward premium
puzzle. Verdelhan (2010) proposes a consumption-based model that can generate negative covariance be-
tween exchange rates and interest rate di⁄erentials. Burnside et al. (2010), however, provide new evidence
suggesting that conventional models of time-varying exchange rate risk premia do not explain the forward
premium puzzle. Carlson, Dahl, and Osler (2008) and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009) show that
a market microstructure approach can potentially shed light on the puzzle.
3There is also evidence that individuals tend to display calibration undercon￿dence about judgments in
easy knowledge domains, though this may be a mechanical e⁄ect (Brenner et al., 1996). In any case, trying
to beat the market in speculative trading is a particularly di¢ cult task (according to the e¢ cient markets
hypothesis, an impossible one). The evidence for overcon￿dence using other constructs, such as the ￿ better
than average￿e⁄ect, is more mixed (see, e.g., Moore and Healy 2008, Clark and Friesen, 2009). Recent
1Biais et al. (2005) ￿nd that individuals who have greater judgmental overcon￿dence ex-
perience poorer trading performance in an experimental ￿nancial market. Consistent with
the importance of judgmental overcon￿dence, Froot and Frankel (1989) provide evidence of
overreaction in currency traders￿expectations about future exchange rate depreciations. Fur-
thermore, survey evidence indicates that currency market professionals tend to overestimate
the precision of their information signals (Oberlechner and Osler, 2008).
A growing analytical and empirical literature has argued that investor overcon￿dence
explains puzzling patterns in stock markets of return predictability, return volatility, volume
of trading, and individual trading losses; Hirshleifer (2001) and Barberis and Thaler (2003)
provide recent reviews. If a systematic bias such as overcon￿dence causes anomalies in
stock markets, it should also leave footprints in bond and foreign exchange markets. An
explanation for anomalies is more credible if it explains a wide range of patterns, rather
than being tailored to just one puzzle in one type of market.
In our model, overcon￿dent individuals think that their information signal about the
future money growth di⁄erential is more precise than it actually is. As a result, investor
expectations overreact to the signal. This causes both the forward and spot exchange rates to
overshoot their average long run levels in the same direction. The consumption price level and
the spot exchange rate are in￿ uenced by a transactions demand for money, whereas forward
rates are additionally in￿ uenced by speculative considerations, i.e., the expected return from
holding domestic or foreign bonds. In our monetary framework, which is conventional except
for the presence of overcon￿dent investors, these considerations cause the forward rate to
overshoot more than the spot rate, which implies that the forward premium rises in response
to a positive signal. Later, the overreaction in the spot rate is, on average, reversed. The
rise in the forward premium is a predictor of this correction, and hence, on average (under
reasonable parameter values), is a negative predictor of future exchange rate changes.
Another feature of foreign exchange markets is that professional forecast errors, de￿ned as
the di⁄erence between the exchange rate realization and the exchange rate forecast, are neg-
atively correlated with the forward premium (Froot and Frankel, 1989; Bacchetta, Mertens
and van Wincoop, 2009). Our model is consistent with this ￿nding if we interpret the profes-
sional forecasts as matching the expectations of investors in our model, because the forward
rate re￿ ects investor expectations of the future spot exchange rate. Since these expectations
models have proposed rational explanations for why di⁄erent overcon￿dence measures vary di⁄erently with
task di¢ culty (see, e.g., Moore and Healy, 2008; Benoit and Dubra, 2009).
2and the forward rate overreact to information more strongly than the current spot rate, a
rise in the forward premium is associated with a negative forecast error.
The sign of the slope coe¢ cient in a regression of the future spot rate change on the
forward premium re￿ ects two opposing e⁄ects. Overreaction to signals, as described above,
favors a negative coe¢ cient. On the other hand, any foreseeable component in the money
growth di⁄erential that is not subject to overreaction favors the forward premium positively
predicting future spot rate changes. This is the conventional e⁄ect that makes the empirical
￿ndings a puzzle.
Consistent with the data, we show that over short horizons the overreaction-correction
e⁄ect dominates, but over long horizons the positive conventional e⁄ect eventually domi-
nates. Intuitively, over time mispricing in the spot exchange rate attenuates, whereas the
e⁄ects of foreseeable di⁄erences in expected money growth and in￿ ation rates across coun-
tries accumulate. Thus, a distinctive feature of our model is that it explains evidence that
the forward premium regression coe¢ cients switch from negative to positive at very long
horizons (Chinn and Meredith, 2004).
There is a tendency for countries with high average interest rates relative to the U.S.
over long periods of time also to have high average depreciation relative to the dollar (e.g.,
Cochrane, 1999). Consequently, if average rates of depreciation against the dollar are re-
gressed on average interest rate di⁄erentials, the slope coe¢ cient in this cross-sectional re-
gression is typically positive. Our model is consistent with this contrasting pattern in cross-
sectional versus time-series regressions. In our model, the long-run averages of the interest
rate di⁄erentials and rates of currency depreciation between countries re￿ ect average money
growth di⁄erentials, and tend to average out the transitory e⁄ects of mispricing. So the
cross-sectional regression behaves conventionally. In contrast, as we have discussed above,
mispricing plays a crucial role in the behavior of the time-series regression.
Our benchmark model assumes purchasing power parity (PPP), but the qualitative and
quantitative implications do not rely upon this assumption. In Section 5, we modify the
model to allow for deviations from PPP at the level of the aggregate consumer prices by
incorporating nontraded goods and sticky prices as in Calvo (1983). We ￿nd that the mag-
nitude of the forward premium bias remains about the same for reasonable values of the
Calvo price stickiness parameter. The modi￿ed model, however, has the desirable feature
that the price level does not overshoot its average long-run level in response to a signal about
3future money growth di⁄erentials.
Our benchmark model also assumes that monetary policy is characterized by exogenous
money growth. This allows us to capture the basic insight in closed-form. In reality, policy
makers adjust short-term interest rates in response to economic conditions. In Section 6, we
therefore characterize monetary policy as an interest rate rule. We show that if this rule is
incorporated in our sticky price model we still obtain downward forward premium bias so
long as there is overcon￿dence, where the magnitude of the bias is increasing in the degree
of overcon￿dence.
Several recent papers have provided insightful analyses of how investor irrationality can
potentially explain the forward premium puzzle.4 An early application of irrationality to
foreign exchange markets is provided by Frankel and Froot (1990a). In the model of Mark
and Wu (1998), distortion in investors￿beliefs is exogenously speci￿ed to occur in the ￿rst
moment of exchange returns: noise traders overweight the forward premium when predicting
future changes in the exchange rate. Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) o⁄er an explanation of
the forward premium puzzle based upon a distortion in investors￿beliefs about the dynamics
of the forward premium, but are agnostic as to the source of the distorted beliefs.5
Our paper di⁄ers from past behavioral explanations for the forward premium puzzle
in possessing a combination of features: assumptions about belief formation based upon
evidence from psychology, explicit modeling of the belief formation process, and explicit
modeling of the equilibrium forward premium without making exogenous assumptions about
its dynamics.6 Furthermore, our approach provides a distinctive additional set of predictions
about the forward premium bias, and the psychological bias that we assume has been shown
to have realistic implications for security markets in general, not just the foreign exchange
market.
Speci￿cally, we show that the average negative relationship between the forward premium
and future exchange rate changes is a natural consequence of a well-documented cognitive
4Bacchetta and Wincoop (2007, 2009) propose a middle ground between behavioral and fully rational
risk-premium explanations for the forward discount puzzle. In their approach, the forward premium puzzle
can result from a combination of infrequent and partial information processing.
5Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) assume that the forward premium follows a persistent process, but in-
vestors mistakenly perceive an additional transitory component in its dynamics. This distorted belief leads
the nominal exchange rate to underreact to interest rate innovations, which is opposite to the overcon￿dence-
induced overreaction in our model. Thus, the mechanism used by Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) to explain
the forward discount puzzle is di⁄erent from that studied here.
6McCallum (1994) also emphasizes the need for behavioral approaches to provide an underlying motivation
for their assumptions about the form of irrationality or noise trading.
4bias￿ overcon￿dence. We derive price relationships from investor beliefs, rather than di-
rectly making assumptions about trading behavior. Furthermore, we do not assume that
belief errors have a particular correlation with the forward premium, but rather derive this
correlation from the psychological premise.
Overcon￿dence is not an ex post explanation chosen speci￿cally to ￿t the forward pre-
mium puzzle. Investor overcon￿dence has been used to explain a range of other cross-
sectional and time-series patterns of return predictability in securities markets as well as
patterns in volume, volatility, and investor trading pro￿ts.7 Thus, our approach o⁄ers a par-
simonious explanation for a range of anomalies in asset markets, which helps avoid possible
concerns about over￿tting the theoretical model to the anomaly being explained.
A common challenge to psychology-based approaches to securities markets anomalies is
to explain how irrational investors can have an important e⁄ect on market prices if there are
smart arbitrageurs. In our setting, there is an opportunity for rational investors to pro￿t from
the currency carry trade, a strategy that exploits the forward premium bias. This involves
borrowing money in a country with a low interest rate, and investing in another country with
a higher interest rate. However, the risk inherent in carry trades limits the extent to which
risk averse investors will engage in arbitrage.8 Uncertainty about a country￿ s in￿ ation rate
is a systematic risk, so that even if the market prices re￿ ect incorrect expectations, rational
investors are not presented with a risk-free arbitrage opportunity (on imperfect arbitrage of
systematic mispricing, see Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 2001).
Furthermore, the behavioral ￿nance literature o⁄ers several reasons why irrational in-
vestors do not necessarily lose money competing with the rational ones, and why even if
irrational investors are prone to losing money, imperfect rationality can still in￿ uence price.9
7Individual investors trade actively and on average lose money on their trades, which is consistent with
overcon￿dence (e.g., DeBondt and Thaler, 1985, Barber and Odean, 2000). Investor overcon￿dence has been
proposed as an explanation for several patterns in stock markets, such as aggressive trading and high return
volatility (e.g., Odean 1998), price momentum, long-term reversals, and underreactions to corporate events
(e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998; 2001), return comovements (Peng and Xiong, 2006), and
speculative price bubbles (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003).
8Predictability in excess currency returns implied by the forward premium puzzle is low (with R2 typi-
cally less than 0:05) and largely overshadowed by uncertainty about future exchange rates (Bacchetta and
Wincoop, 2006). The carry trade entails substantial risk. For example, the carry trade of Goldman Sachs￿
Global Alpha Fund between Japanese yen and Australian dollar led to major losses in August 2007.
9Reasons why imperfectly rational investors may earn high expected pro￿ts and/or remain important
include a possible greater willingness of overcon￿dent investors to bear risk or to exploit information ag-
gressively, limited investment horizons of the arbitrageurs, wealth reshu› ing across generations, and the
existence of market frictions. See Hirshleifer (2001) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) for discussions of these
issues.
5For example, Biais and Shadur (2000) show that Darwinian selection does not eliminate
irrational traders.
In the foreign exchange context, even if less sophisticated currency users on average lose
relative to a set of smart speculators, less sophisticated individuals will still need to hold
money balances, so their money demands will still play a role in determining equilibrium
price levels and therefore spot and forward exchange rates. Hence, we do not expect complete
elimination of the forward premium bias. Froot and Thaler (1990) and Burnside et al. (2006)
provide evidence that market frictions and other practical constraints limit the pro￿tability
of trading strategies designed to take advantage of the forward premium anomaly.
2 The Basic Idea
In foreign exchange markets, there is a need for subjective judgment in forecasting future
in￿ ation, which creates scope for overcon￿dence.10 To illustrate how overcon￿dence a⁄ects
the forward premium regression,
st+1 ￿ st = ￿0 + ￿1(ft ￿ st) + ￿t+1; (1)
we now present a simple intuitive discussion that relies on risk neutrality and price dynam-
ics that are typical in monetary models of the exchange rate. Figure 1 plots the path of
movement for the spot and forward exchange rates from date ￿1 to date 1, conditional on
a positive date-0 signal about the date-1 in￿ ation di⁄erential. For ease of presentation, we
assume that at date ￿1 the economy is in a steady state in which the expected future in-
￿ ation di⁄erential is zero, so that the spot exchange rate s coincides with the forward rate
f.
If there were no overreaction to the date-0 signal in the spot market, the spot exchange
rate would rise to sR
0 at date 0, and would be expected to rise further to the point labeled
ER
0 (s1) at date 1; the R superscript indicates values under rational beliefs. The two-step
increase in the exchange rate in response to news about future in￿ ation is a standard feature
of rational-expectations-based monetary models. Under risk neutrality, if there were no
overreaction in the forward rate, it would be fR
0 = ER
0 (s1). The forward premium at
10The existence of an active industry selling macroeconomic forecasts is consistent with our assumption
that at least some investors believe they can obtain high quality signals about future in￿ ation. Previous
studies share our assumption that individuals believe they possess meaningful information signals about
aggregate macro-factors (e.g., Subrahmanyam, 1991).




0 (s1) ￿ sR
0 > 0. In this environment the coe¢ cient in (1) would be one.
How can the coe¢ cient be negative? The answer lies in the fact that both the spot
and the forward exchange rates are market prices, each subject to its own misreaction.11
Overcon￿dence causes investors to overreact to their date-0 signal about the future in￿ ation
di⁄erential, which drives the forward rate above the level predicted by rational expectations.
We illustrate this overreaction in Figure 1, by assuming that the date-0 forward rate rises
from f = s to f0 > ER
0 (s1). Meanwhile, such overreaction also causes the spot rate to
overshoot its rational level in the same direction, so that s0 > sR
0 . If investors are su¢ ciently
overcon￿dent in the quality of their signals, the spot rate can overshoot its long-run average
level, s0 > ER
0 (s1), this being the case illustrated in Figure 1.12
In summary, there are two possibilities. In both cases, the monetary model predicts
that the forward rate overshoots more than the spot rate does in response to the positive
in￿ ationary signal; i.e. f0 ￿ s0 > 0. In the ￿rst case, where investors have a modest degree
of overcon￿dence, s0 overshoots the rational-expectations equilibrium price, sR
0 , but not the
long-run average level of the exchange rate, so that ER
0 (s1) ￿ s0 > 0. In this scenario the
coe¢ cient ￿1 in (1) is positive but less than one. In the second case, where investors have a
stronger degree of overcon￿dence, s0 overshoots its average long-run level, ER
0 (s1), so that
ER
0 (s1)￿s0 < 0. In this case, the coe¢ cient ￿1 in (1) is negative. In the latter scenario, the
rise in the forward premium coincides with the overcon￿dence-induced overreaction in the
spot exchange rate, but also predicts the subsequent correction in the spot rate. It is this
e⁄ect that results in a negative slope coe¢ cient.
3 The Model
In the basic model we consider a general equilibrium setting in which representative indi-
viduals in two countries hold their respective national monies because domestic real money
11The asset market approach to exchange rate determination has long recognized that exchange rate
movements are primarily driven by news that changes expectations (e.g., Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 1996, p. 529).
12It is evident from this argument that if the spot rate did not overreact, the forward premium regression
coe¢ cient would be less than one, but could not be negative. This case can be likened to behavioral stock
market models in which the market-to-book ratio is a negative predictor of future returns. In this analogy,
the stock￿ s market price corresponds to the forward rate (which overreacts strongly), and its book value
corresponds to the spot rate (which does not overreact). This comparison indicates that we cannot fully
explain the forward premium puzzle unless we take into account a distinctive feature of the monetary setting,
the fact that the spot exchange rate (unlike book value) is a market price that itself can overreact.
7balances directly provide utility.13
3.1 The Individual￿ s Problem
We assume that the representative individual in the home country has additively separable
preferences over consumption and real balances, with instantaneous utility function






where ct is aggregate consumption, mt is the date t stock of real money balances, and % > 0
and ￿ > 0 are constants.
We assume that a complete set of state contingent securities are available for sequential
trade. Let the individual￿ s net purchases of a claim to one unit of consumption at date t+1
if state of the world zt+1 is realized be denoted at(zt+1), and let the date t price of this claim




qt(zt+1)at(zt+1)dzt+1 + mt = y + ￿t + at￿1 + mt￿1￿
￿1
t ; (3)
where ￿t is the gross domestic in￿ ation rate, y is a constant endowment of the single good,
and ￿t is lump sum transfers received from the government. In what follows, we denote the
history of events up to date t by zt ￿ (:::;zt￿1;zt).
The stock of domestic money at date t is Mt. At date t, the domestic government creates
new money, Mt ￿ Mt￿1, that it transfers to the representative individual. The real value of
this transfer is ￿t = (Mt￿Mt￿1)=Pt, where Pt is the domestic price level. Since ￿t ￿ Pt=Pt￿1,
it follows that ￿t = mt ￿ mt￿1￿
￿1
t .
At each date t, the individual chooses ct, mt, a function at(￿), and contingency plans for
future values of these variables, to maximize lifetime expected utility, subject to the budget
constraint, (3), and no-Ponzi scheme condition, at(zt+1) ￿ ￿y=(1￿￿), at all dates, where ￿






















13Qualitatively similar results could be derived using a setting in which money has value because it reduces
the transaction cost of making consumption purchases.
8subject to (3), where  t(zt+1jzt) is the individual￿ s subjective probability density function













































t qt(zt+1) = ￿ct+1(zt+1)
￿1 t(zt+1jz
t) (5)












where the expectations operator EC
t denotes the individual￿ s subjective expectation given
time-t information.
A domestic nominal bond purchased at date t pays one unit of domestic money in all states
at date t+1, or equivalently pays 1=Pt+1(zt+1) units of consumption if event zt+1 is realized.
Therefore, its price in units of consumption at date t is
R
zt+1 Pt+1(zt+1)￿1qt(zt+1)dzt+1. Using
(5) to substitute out qt(zt+1) from this expression, the price of the bond in domestic currency













The foreign economy is symmetric to the domestic economy. In what follows, foreign
variables are denoted by an asterisk (￿). Individuals in the two economies have the same
preferences, except that foreign individuals derive utility from holding real balances in foreign
currency. Individuals in the two economies also have the same information sets and subjective
probability distributions over events. First order conditions symmetric to (6) and (7) hold




t￿1), where ￿t and ￿￿
t are stationary stochastic processes to
be speci￿ed in more detail below.
93.2 Competitive Equilibrium




t = y + y
￿: (8)




Since the world endowment of goods is constant, equilibrium consumption in the two coun-
tries is constant across time and states of the world, ct = c and c￿
t = c￿ for all t.
We simplify the ￿rst order conditions (6) and (7) using the condition that ct = c for all
t, and the fact that ￿t = mt￿1e￿t=mt:
1 = %m
￿￿




Qt = 1 ￿ %m
￿￿
t c: (11)
The nominal interest rate in the domestic economy is it = Q
￿1
t ￿ 1. Given a law of motion
for the money growth rate, ￿t, (10) is solved for the equilibrium value of mt. Given this
solution, (11) is solved for the equilibrium price of the domestic bond. Analogs of (10) and
(11) in the foreign economy are solved for m￿
t and Q￿
t. Finally, the PPP condition is used to













3.3 Information and Expectations
For simplicity, we assume that the only source of random variation in the two economies
is monetary policy. Speci￿cally, we assume that money growth at date t + 1 in the home
country is
￿t+1 = ￿ + ￿t+1 + ut; (13)
where ￿t+1 ￿ N(0;￿2
￿) and ut ￿ N(0;￿2
u) are i.i.d. processes. At date t individuals observe
only a noisy signal about ut, ￿t = ut+￿t, where ￿t ￿ N(0;￿2
￿) is an i.i.d. process. We assume
that money growth in the foreign country has a similar law of motion. Individuals￿date-t









mutually independent, although covariance between the shocks in the two countries could
easily be accommodated.
As in several previous models of overcon￿dence in securities markets, we model overcon-
￿dence as overestimation of signal precision. Overestimation of the precision of the signal ￿t
means that individuals underestimate the variance of ￿t, assuming that it is equal to ￿2
C < ￿2
￿.
Thus, overcon￿dent individuals take the noisy signal as more informative than it actually is.
After receiving the signal ￿t, individuals update their expectations about future money
growth in a Bayesian fashion, subject to their misperceptions of signal precision. We describe
the degree of overcon￿dence using the parameter ￿, where



















The superscripts C and R denote overcon￿dent and rational perceptions. Since individuals in
the model are overcon￿dent, ￿
C describes their belief updating, i.e., EC
t ut = ￿
C￿t. Similarly,
￿
R describes how a rational individual would update, i.e., ER




it follows that ￿
C > ￿
R and thus EC
t ut > ER
t ut. In other words, overcon￿dent individuals
overreact to the date-t signal about future money growth. The parameter ￿ measures the
degree of overcon￿dence. Since ￿
C > ￿
R, ￿ > 0. The lower is ￿2
C, the greater is the degree
of overcon￿dence and the larger is ￿. At date t + 1, the true value of ut is revealed, and
individuals correct their date-t expectational errors.
We allow for di⁄erences between ￿2
u, ￿2
￿, ￿2
￿ and their foreign counterparts so that ￿
R varies
by country. However, we assume that ￿ is common to the two countries, since overcon￿dence
is a property of individual perceptions, not of the underlying processes for ￿t and ￿￿
t.
3.4 Prices, Interest Rates and Exchange Rates
We solve for the non-stochastic steady state value of real money balances, m, by setting
mt+1 = mt = m and ￿t+1 = ￿ in (10), which gives m = [%c=(1 ￿ ￿e￿￿)]
1=￿. To solve the




t ^ mt+1 ￿ ￿
￿1 (1 + ￿) ^ mt = E
C
t ^ ￿t+1; (14)
where ^ mt ￿ (mt ￿ m)=m, ^ ￿t ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿, i ￿ ￿
￿1e￿ ￿ 1 is the steady state interest rate, and
￿ ￿ 1=(￿i) (details are provided in the Appendix). A similar condition holds in the foreign
country, where the steady state interest rate is i￿ is ￿
￿1e￿￿ ￿ 1, and ￿￿ ￿ 1=(￿i￿).
11The unique stationary solution for ^ mt is given by









t ^ ￿t+j: (15)
Given the information structure and overcon￿dent expectations described above, EC
t ^ ￿t+1 =
￿
C￿t and EC
t ^ ￿t+j = 0 for j > 1. Hence
^ mt = ￿￿￿t; (16)
where ￿ = ￿(1 + ￿)
￿1 ￿









t is the signal of future foreign money growth, and ￿￿ = ￿￿ (1 + ￿￿)
￿1 ￿
C￿.
We can write (11), once linearized, in terms of ^ {t = (it ￿ i)=(1 + i):
^ {t = ￿^ mt=￿ = (￿=￿)￿t: (18)
>From (18) we see that ￿ can be interpreted as the semi-elasticity of the demand for real









With these solutions in hand, a log-linear approximation of the spot exchange rate can
be obtained from (12). Letting st ￿ lnSt, and using (18) and (19), to ￿rst order,
st = ln(m






This implies that the change in the spot rate is
￿st+1 = ￿￿￿t+1 ￿ ￿
￿￿￿
￿
t+1 + ￿t+1 ￿ ￿
￿
t+1
= ￿ ￿ + ￿￿￿t+1 ￿ ￿
￿￿￿
￿
t+1 + ￿ ￿t+1 + ￿ ut; (21)
where ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿￿
t, ￿ ut ￿ ut ￿ u￿
t and ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿.
Finally, covered interest parity holds in this economy, 1 + it = (1 + i￿
t)Ft=St, where Ft is
the forward exchange rate. Letting ft ￿ lnFt, to ￿rst order,
ft ￿ st = ￿ ￿ +^ {t ￿^ {
￿





124 Empirical Predictions of the Model
We now explore several empirical predictions of the basic model. The central result is that
individuals￿overcon￿dence causes the forward rate to overshoot more than the spot rate,
making the forward premium a measure of overreaction and a predictor of the subsequent
correction in the spot rate. We show that with su¢ cient overcon￿dence, the model is con-
sistent with a wide variety of empirical ￿ndings found in the literature.
4.1 Forward Premium Regressions
Proposition 1 In the model, the probability limits of the estimated coe¢ cients in the
forward premium regression, (1), are
￿0 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿ ￿























If the two countries have the same average money growth rates, ￿ ￿ = 0, then
￿0 = 0 and ￿1 = 1 ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿):
Proof: See the appendix.￿
Proposition 1 shows that overcon￿dence can explain the forward premium puzzle. When
there is no overcon￿dence (i.e., ￿ = 0), ￿1 = 1, ￿0 = 0, and uncovered interest rate parity
(UIP) holds. When there is overcon￿dence (i.e., ￿ > 0), ￿1 is less than unity and becomes
negative with a su¢ ciently high level of investor overcon￿dence.
To understand the result, it is helpful to impose symmetry across the two money growth
processes. Assume, therefore, that ￿ ￿ = 0, and that the processes ut, u￿




R￿. These assumptions imply that ￿ = ￿￿, ￿
C = ￿
C￿ and ￿ = ￿￿. As the
proposition states, they also imply that ￿0 = 0 and ￿1 = 1 ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿).
When the change in the spot exchange rate is regressed on the lagged one-period forward
premium, the slope coe¢ cient, ￿1, can be decomposed into two terms. The ￿rst term in ￿1 is
unity, which re￿ ects the conventional force that drives the usual UIP result. The second term
re￿ ects investor overcon￿dence. The more overcon￿dent investors are, the more negative the
relationship between the forward premium and the subsequent exchange rate depreciation.
If ￿ > 1=(1 + ￿), then ￿1 < 0.
13To further understand Proposition 1 it is helpful to consider the responses of the do-
mestic interest rate and the exchange rate to the arrival, at date 0, of a unit signal about
domestic money growth at date 1. We ￿rst consider the case where individuals have rational
expectations (￿
C = ￿
R and ￿ = 0). This is a case where UIP holds.
A unit signal shock at date 0 is any combination of u0 and ￿0 such that ￿0 = 1. Figure
2(a) illustrates the e⁄ects of the signal shock for two such combinations.14 In the ￿rst
scenario, the signal is false (u0 = 0 and ￿0 = 1), whereas in the second scenario, the signal
is true (u0 = 1 and ￿0 = 0). Since individuals do not observe u0 and ￿0, but know their
distributions, expectations can be calculated as if the two scenarios have probabilities 1￿￿
R
and ￿
R.15 Thus, individuals expect domestic money growth at date 1 to rise by ￿
R. The
expectation of higher future money growth causes the demand for real money balances to
drop by ￿￿(1 + ￿)
￿1 ￿
R. Consequently, the domestic price level rises and, from (20), the
exchange rate depreciates by ￿(1 + ￿)
￿1 ￿
R.
At date 1, suppose the signal is revealed to be false. In this case, the price level and
exchange rate go back to their original levels by falling ￿￿(1 + ￿)
￿1 ￿
R. If, however, the
signal is revealed to be true, the price level and exchange rate go to their new long-run levels
(1 unit higher than their initial values) by rising a further 1￿￿(1 + ￿)
￿1 ￿
R. Under rational
expectations, the expected change in the exchange rate from date 0 to date 1 is a weighted
average of these two possibilities:
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By equation (18), the interest rate at date 0 rises by the same amount ^ {0 = ￿
R=(1+￿): The
forward premium regression￿ s slope coe¢ cient is the ratio of these two expressions because
there are no expected deviations of the interest rate from its steady state value from date
1 forward, and no expected changes in the exchange rate from date 2 forward. The slope
coe¢ cient is, therefore, 1.
Now consider the case where individuals are overcon￿dent, which is illustrated in Figure
2(b).16 In this case, we simply replace ￿
R with ￿
C in the above discussion. Thus, when
14For the purposes of Figure 2(a), we set ￿ = 7 and ￿
R = 0:35.
15Since u0 and ￿0 are normally distributed, the signal extraction problem faced by individuals implies that





This is equivalent to individuals believing that money growth will increase by 1 with probability ￿
R and by
0 with probability 1 ￿ ￿
R.
16For the purposes of Figure 2(b), we set ￿ = 7, ￿
R = 0:35 and ￿ = 0:3.
14overcon￿dent individuals see a unit signal at date 0, they expect the exchange rate to change
at date 1 by
E
C























By equation (18), the interest rate at date 0 rises by the same amount, ^ {0 = ￿
R=(1 + ￿):
Given the true values of ￿2
u and ￿2
￿, however, the mean change of the exchange rate at date
1 is equal to
E
R


























Thus, the forward premium regression￿ s slope coe¢ cient is 1 ￿ ￿(1 + ￿). If individuals are
su¢ ciently overcon￿dent, as they are in Figure 2(b), with ￿ > 1=(1 + ￿), then the slope
coe¢ cient is negative.
The key factor driving the result in the overcon￿dence case is that individuals￿expecta-
tions put excessive weight on the quality of the signal. As Figures 2(a) and 2(b) illustrate,
the e⁄ects of overcon￿dence are twofold. First, the exchange rate overreacts to a signal at
date 0. Second, individuals put too little weight on the possibility that the exchange rate
will correct at date 1. The combination of these two e⁄ects, when su¢ ciently strong, leads
to a negative slope coe¢ cient in the forward premium regression.
We illustrate the magnitude of the forward premium bias generated by the model using
realistic values for ￿ and the overcon￿dence parameter ￿. The average ￿ estimate for six
countries (Austria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Russia) in Table 3 of Cagan
(1956) is 5:36. Cagan￿ s estimate is relevant for our analysis, because, to ￿rst order, the
expression for money demand in our model, (18), is equivalent to Cagan￿ s. For the same six
countries, the average ￿ estimate in Table 2 of Sargent (1977) and Table 1 of Goodfriend
(1982) are 4:1 and 3:7 respectively. Bailey (1956) uses ￿ = 7 in his speci￿cation. Lucas
(2000) ￿nds that ￿ = 7 best ￿ts the U.S. data for the 1900-1994 period. Phylaktis and
Taylor (1993) ￿nd higher ￿ for ￿ve Latin American countries with an average estimate of
12:0. Based on these studies, we use ￿ in the range between 3 and 11.17
17The interest rate semi-elasticity, ￿, relates the logarithm of real balances to the nominal interest rate
elasticity, which is the parameter ￿0 in the log-log money demand function of the form mt ￿pt = c￿￿0 lnit.
Barro (1970) theoretically argues and empirically supports the hypothesis that ￿0 = 0:5, while Ball (2001)
estimates a money demand elasticity ￿0 = 0:05 using U.S. post-war data. Given a 5 percent steady state
interest rate, values of ￿ between 3 and 11 translate into values of ￿0 between 0:15 and 0:55.
15For the overcon￿dence parameter ￿, we rely on Friesen and Weller (2006) who measure
the magnitude of analysts￿overcon￿dence using earnings forecast data. They de￿ne over-
con￿dence in the same manner as we do, and assume that analysts perceive the precision of
their private signals to be 1 + a times the true signal precision. That is, ￿2
C = ￿2
￿=(1 + a) in
our notation. It is straightforward to verify that our overcon￿dence parameter ￿ is related










The estimated value for a in Table 3 of Friesen and Weller (2006) is 0:94 with a standard




we use ￿ in the range between 0:1 and 0:4.
Table 1 provides estimates of ￿1 using monthly data over the period 1983￿ 2008 for 11
major currencies. As can be seen in Table 1, the average estimate of ￿1 is roughly ￿1, but
the estimates of ￿1 vary considerably around this value. Figure 3 illustrates the magnitude
of the forward premium bias generated by our model. As Figure 3 shows, under realistic
parameter values (3 < ￿ < 11 and 0:1 < ￿ < 0:4) our model generates forward premium
bias that closely matches the magnitudes observed in the data.
4.2 Further Empirical Implications in the Time Series Dimension
For simplicity, throughout this subsection, we impose the symmetry condition that ￿ ￿ = 0
and we assume that the processes ut, u￿
t, ￿t, and ￿￿
t are such that ￿
R = ￿
R￿. Therefore we
have ￿ = ￿￿, ￿
C = ￿
C￿ and ￿ = ￿￿.
4.2.1 Prediction Errors and the Forward Premium
As in Froot and Frenkel (1989) we can decompose the change in the spot rate as
￿st+1 = E
C
t ￿st+1 + st+1 ￿ E
C
t st+1:
The ￿rst component, EC
t ￿st+1, is individuals￿forecast of the change in the spot rate. The
second component is individuals￿forecast error. By construction, the slope coe¢ cient ob-
tained from the forward premium regression can therefore be interpreted as the sum of the
slope coe¢ cients obtained from regressing EC
t ￿st+1 and the forecast error separately on the
forward premium. This observation leads to the following proposition.
16Proposition 2 When investors are overcon￿dent, their prediction errors are negatively
correlated with the forward premium and account for all of the bias in the forward premium
regression.
Proof: The change of the exchange rate at date t + 1 is given by (21). It follows that
overcon￿dent investors￿forecast of the change in the exchange rate is
E
C
t ￿st+1 = ￿￿￿ ￿t + E
C
t ￿ ut = (￿=￿)￿ ￿t;
where ￿ ￿t = ￿t ￿ ￿
￿
t. This is the same as the expression for the forward premium derived
from (22), ft ￿st = (￿=￿)￿ ￿t. So the slope coe¢ cient in a regression of EC
t ￿st+1 on ft ￿st is
unity. It follows that the slope coe¢ cient in a regression of the forecast error st+1 ￿ EC
t st+1
on ft ￿ st is ￿￿(1 + ￿).￿
The implication that forecast errors are negatively correlated with the forward premium
is supported by the empirical ￿ndings in Froot and Frankel (1989), who regress se
t+1 ￿ st+1
on the forward premium, where se
t+1 is the average investor forecast (based on survey data)
of the spot exchange rate at date t + 1. Froot and Frankel ￿nd that the slope coe¢ cient
in their pooled regressions is signi￿cantly greater than zero; this ￿nding is robust across
surveys. Since the left-hand-side of Froot and Frankel￿ s regression equation is the negative
of forecasters￿expectational error, this indicates that forecast errors are negatively correlated
with the forward premium.
Froot and Frankel (1989) also regress se
t+1￿st on the forward premium. Interpreting se
t+1
as EC
t st+1, our model predicts that the slope coe¢ cient in this regression should be unity.
For seven out of the nine surveys reported by Froot and Frankel the slope coe¢ cient in this
regression is insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from one.18
4.2.2 Longer-Horizon Regressions
In Section 4.1, we show that there can be a negative relationship between the one-period
forward premium and the subsequent one-period change in the spot exchange rate. We now
examine the relation between the forward premium and the future spot rate change in a
longer-horizon regression. Speci￿cally, we consider a regression of the n-period change in
the spot exchange rate st+n ￿ st on the n-period forward premium fnt ￿ st, where fnt is the
18Frankel and Chinn (1993) ￿nd similar results using a broader set of individual currency pairs. For 24
out of 34 currency/time period pairs they report the slope coe¢ cient to be insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from one.
17n-period forward exchange rate. We examine whether the slope coe¢ cient will be more or
less negative for n > 1 than for n = 1.
Proposition 3 In a regression of the n-period change in the spot exchange rate, st+n ￿st,
on the n-period forward premium, fnt ￿st, under our benchmark assumptions, the constant
and slope coe¢ cient are
￿n0 = 0 and ￿n1 = 1 ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿):
Proof: In the model




￿￿￿ ￿t+j + ￿ ￿t+j + ￿ ut+j￿1
￿
and fnt ￿ st = EC
t (st+n ￿ st). The latter condition follows from the fact that UIP holds
for agents￿expectations. Given our assumptions about ￿t, ￿t and ut, EC
t (st+n ￿ st+1) =
ER
t (st+n ￿ st+1) = 0. Hence fnt ￿ st = EC
t (st+1 ￿ st) = ft ￿ st and st+n ￿ st is equal to
st+1 ￿ st plus a mean zero error term that is orthogonal to time-t information. Therefore,
the coe¢ cients in a regression of st+n ￿ st on fnt are the same as in a regression of st+1 ￿ st
on ft ￿ st. ￿
Proposition 3 implies that when investors are overcon￿dent, the n-period forward pre-
mium is still a biased predictor of the subsequent n-period exchange rate depreciation and
the degree of bias does not vary with the forward horizon.
This implication of Proposition 3 is consistent with empirical results obtained with n = 1,
3, 6 and 12 months. These are shown in Table 1. Although there is some variation in the
degree of bias, the average slope coe¢ cient in the regressions does not vary systematically
with the forward horizon. In fact, the typical slope coe¢ cient remains very close to ￿1 at
all forward horizons.
At much longer horizons of ￿ve and ten years, Chinn and Meredith (2004) ￿nd less
negative forward premium bias. Our model can easily accommodate Chinn and Meredith￿ s
￿ndings if we generalize our assumptions about ￿ ￿t, which is the di⁄erence, across the two
countries, between the mean-zero unpredictable shocks to money growth. In particular, if
we assume that ￿ ￿t is persistent, and has considerably less variability than ￿ ￿t, we can easily
rationalize the stylized facts at both short and long horizons.
Proposition 4 If the shock to the money growth di⁄erential, ￿ ￿t, is a persistent AR(1)
process, with AR parameter ￿, then the slope coe¢ cient in the n-period forward premium
18regression is increasing in n and is given by


















Proof: See the appendix. ￿
We draw three main conclusions from Proposition 4. First, since $n > 0, as long as agents
are overcon￿dent (￿ > 0) it follows that the slope coe¢ cient ￿n1 < 1 for all n. Second, if
￿ > (1+￿)￿1, then, for any particular value of n, there is always a su¢ ciently small value of
var(￿ ￿t), such that ￿n1 < 0. Third, when ￿ > 0, $n is decreasing in n, implying, as asserted,
that ￿n1 is increasing in n. Therefore, the amount of forward premium bias diminishes as
the investment horizon increases. In order for the value of ￿n1 to be negative and relatively
insensitive to n at short horizons, and yet be close to 1 at horizons of ￿ve to ten years, this
version of the model requires a value of ￿ close to 1, and a very small value of var(￿ ￿t) relative
to var(￿ ￿t).
The reason that forward premium bias is less negative at longer horizons is that the
persistence in ￿ ￿t produces a foreseeable component of money growth that strengthens over
time. This induces unbiased predictability in st+n ￿ st that eventually dominates the short-
term (and biased) predictability that derives from the innovation ￿ ￿t.
4.2.3 McCallum Regressions
McCallum (1994) runs a set of regressions
st+1 ￿ st￿n = ￿ ￿n0 + ￿ ￿n1 (ft ￿ st￿n) + ￿ ￿t+1
for n ￿ 1. McCallum ￿nds that the slope coe¢ cient in the regression is typically very close
to one and the R2 is typically close to n=(n+1). In Table 2 we show similar estimates for a
set of 11 developed country currencies over the period 1983￿ 2008. As McCallum points out
these results are easily understood if we consider the fact that st+1￿st￿n = ￿st+1+st￿st￿n
and ft ￿st￿n = ft ￿st +st ￿st￿n. That is, the regressand and the regressor in McCallum￿ s
regression are the regressand and the regressor in the forward premium regression plus a
common term, st ￿st￿n. Given that the variance of ￿st is roughly 100 times that of ft ￿st
19for the currencies in our sample, it is not surprising that the coe¢ cient in the regression
approaches unity as n increases. For similar reasons, the R2 ends up being close to n=(n+1).
In our model, the results for these regressions depend not only on the degree of overcon-
￿dence, ￿, and the interest elasticity parameter, ￿, but also on var(￿ ￿t). To derive model
predictions we set ￿ = 7 and ￿ = 0:25, so that the model-implied value of the forward
premium regression slope coe¢ cient is ￿1 = ￿1. We assume the shocks in the two countries
have equal variances and calibrate ￿u, ￿￿ and ￿￿ so that ￿
R = 0:35 and the model-predicted
values of var(st+1 ￿st) and var(ft ￿st) correspond to their average values in our 11-country
data set. In this case we ￿nd that the slope coe¢ cients in the McCallum regressions for
n = 1, 2, 3 and 4 are, respectively, ￿ ￿11 = 0:89, ￿ ￿21 = 0:94, ￿ ￿31 = 0:96 and ￿ ￿41 = 0:97 (see
details in the Appendix). Thus, for n ￿ 1, in both the model and the data the slope coe¢ -
cient is close to unity. As n increases, in both the model and the data, the slope coe¢ cient
becomes closer to one, although in the model it approaches from below one while in the data
it approaches from above one for most currencies.
4.2.4 The Superiority of the Forward Premium Regression as a Predictor of
the Future Spot Rate
In our model, the forward premium predicts exchange rate changes both for the traditional
reason that it contains information about the future money growth di⁄erential, and for
the reason that it contains information about spot rate mispricing. Therefore, the forward
premium regression provides one method of forecasting the future value of the spot exchange
rate. Similar reasoning implies that regressions based on the realized in￿ ation di⁄erential,
or the latest changes in the spot rate or forward rate, might also be useful for predicting
future exchange rates. We also consider whether the current forward rate, or the current
spot rate, is the best predictor of the future spot rate. We show that the forward premium
regression provides a better predictor of the subsequent spot rate, in terms of mean squared
error, than any of the alternatives.
Proposition 5 In the model, the forward premium regression provides a minimum mean
squared error predictor of the subsequent exchange rate. It dominates alternative predictors
suggested by our model (regressions based on the in￿ ation di⁄erential, or the latest changes
in the forward rate or spot rate, or the simple levels of the current forward or spot rates).
Proof: The proof of the ￿rst part of the proposition is straightforward. Given our results, we
20can write ￿st+1 = ￿￿￿ ￿t+1 + ￿ ut + ￿ ￿t+1. Since ￿ ut is not observed at time t, and ER




R ￿ ￿)￿ ￿t + wt+1 (24)
where wt+1 = ￿￿ ￿t+1 + ￿ ￿t+1 + ￿ ut ￿ ￿
R￿ ￿t is orthogonal to time-t information. Suppose there
is a variable xt, such that xt = ax￿ ￿t for some scalar ax 6= 0. A regression of ￿st+1 on xt
has slope coe¢ cient (￿
R ￿ ￿)=ax and the forecast of ￿st+1 generated by xt is (￿
R ￿ ￿)￿ ￿t.
Therefore, the forecast error associated with this forecasting rule is wt+1. No other forecasting
rule can improve on this result given that (24) holds, and wt+1 is unpredictable. Since
ft ￿ st = (￿=￿)￿ ￿t, the forecasts generated by the forward premium regression are minimum
mean squared error forecasts. The proof of the second part of the proposition is provided in
the appendix.￿
Intuitively, the only information that is useful in forecasting the exchange rate is ￿ ￿t,
and the forward premium is linked one-to-one with ￿ ￿t. The reason for the second part
of the proposition is that the regression-based alternative forecasts contain noise from the
viewpoint of predicting exchange rate changes. These forecasts are linear combinations of ￿ ￿t
and extraneous noise, such as ￿t. Using the current forward (spot) rate as the forecast of the
future exchange rate is suboptimal because it is equivalent to using the forward premium
regression to forecast, while imposing the false restrictions that ￿0 = 0 and ￿1 = 1 (￿1 = 0).
The model￿ s predictions correspond reasonably closely to empirical ￿ndings based on
our 11-country sample. The calibrated version of the model described above predicts that
there are only modest di⁄erences in the accuracy of the di⁄erent forecasting methods, because
variability in ￿st+1 is dominated by unpredictable components. In particular, the calibration
of the model given in Section 4.2.3 implies that the forward premium regression has a root
mean squared error (RMSE) of 2:89 percent, while the regressions based on the change in
the forward and spot rates have RMSEs of 2:96 and 2:95 percent, respectively. Using the
current forward and spot rates as the forecasts of st+1 leads to RMSEs of 2:93 and 2:90
percent, respectively. These values are all close to their empirical counterparts in Table 3,
which shows the RMSE associated with each of the forecasting methods. Consistent with
the model, the forward premium regression typically provides the most accurate forecast.
214.3 Cross-Sectional Regressions
Suppose that ￿st+1 and ft￿st are averaged over many time periods. When the steady state
money growth rates are di⁄erent in countries i and j but the shock processes are identical
and independent of one another, it follows from (21) and (22), that in very large samples
￿sij = f ￿ sij = ￿ ￿ij, where ￿ ￿ij is the steady state money growth rate di⁄erential between
the two economies. Hence, in a cross sectional regression where the individual observations
are pairs of ￿sij and f ￿ sij for individual pairs of countries, i and j, the slope coe¢ cient
obtained will be one and the constant will be zero.
Thus, the model predicts that in contrast with time series regressions, in cross-sectional
regressions with a su¢ ciently long sample period there is no forward premium puzzle. Intu-
itively, over short time horizons forward and spot exchange rates are in￿ uenced by misper-
ceptions about future money growth rates, but over long time horizons the average rates of
exchange rate depreciation are determined by the average money growth di⁄erentials between
pairs of countries. In general, such average e⁄ects tend to be picked up in cross-sectional
regressions, while the short-term mispricing e⁄ects tend to be muted. If the sample period
is su¢ ciently long, the e⁄ects of investor overcon￿dence will be eliminated in cross-sectional
regressions.
4.4 The Carry Trade: An Extension
The model implies that a rational investor could, on average, earn excess returns by holding
the short term debt of countries whose short term interest rates are temporarily higher
relative to the interest rates of other countries. In other words, there are pro￿ts to be earned
through carry trade strategies. The Economist (2007) quotes the estimate of one market
analyst that as much as $1 trillion may be invested in the yen carry trade.
Since we have assumed that investors are identically overcon￿dent, in equilibrium they
do not engage in the carry trade to exploit the forward premium bias. However, all results of
the model carry through identically if we introduce a set of risk averse rational investors with
measure zero. In such an extended model, the risk-bearing capacity of rational investors is
too small to allow them to a⁄ect prices non-negligibly. However, they would engage in carry
trade activity to pro￿t from the forward premium bias.19
19If, instead, we were to introduce a set of rational investors with positive measure, we conjecture that
this would reduce but not eliminate the forward premium bias. In many behavioral models, prices re￿ ect
the beliefs of both rational and irrational traders, with weights that depend on the risk bearing capacities
22It is worth emphasizing that the model predicts that pro￿ts are available by trading based
on transitory interest rate di⁄erentials, not by holding the treasury bills of a country that
persistently has a higher average nominal interest rate. This is consistent with the empirical
￿ndings that countries with steadily higher interest rates and in￿ ation (than in the U.S.)
have had steady currency depreciations (against the U.S. dollar), as predicted by UIP (see,
for example, Cochrane, 1999).
5 A Model with Deviations from PPP
So far we have assumed that PPP holds for the aggregate consumption de￿ ators in the two
economies. In this section we extend the model to allow for violations of PPP for aggregate
price de￿ ators by introducing nontraded goods. We model nontraded goods producers as
monopolistic competitors and we introduce price stickiness. This lets us study the role of
overcon￿dence in a more realistic setting in which prices adjust slowly to in￿ ationary shocks.
Although introducing these new features in our model a⁄ects the magnitude of the implied
forward premium bias, we ￿nd that the main implications of the model do not dependent
upon the PPP assumption we made in Section 3. For a wide range of plausible parameter
values, overcon￿dence continues to imply substantial bias in the forward premium regression.
In the expanded model there are two goods, traded and nontraded. Traded goods are
modeled, as before, as an endowment. Each country produces its own nontraded good with
labor. We separately consider households, who make decisions about consumption, labor
e⁄ort, and money and asset holdings, and monopolistically competitive ￿rms, who make
decisions about production, labor input and the pricing of goods.
5.1 The Household￿ s Problem
We now assume that representative household in the domestic economy has the instantaneous
utility function











where ct is aggregate consumption, mt is the date-t stock of real money balances, nt is labor,
and % > 0, ￿ > 0, # > 0 and ￿ > 0 are constants.
of the di⁄erent groups (see, e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 2001).






where cTt is the consumption of traded goods, cNt is the consumption of nontraded goods,
and 0 < ! < 1. There is a single traded good. The output of this good, in each country, is a
constant endowment. There are many di⁄erentiated nontraded goods within each country.











where " > 1 and cNit is the date-t consumption of variety i of the nontraded goods. House-
holds take the prices of all goods as given. Consequently, it is straightforward to show that

















where PTt is the price of traded goods.




qt(zt+1)at(zt+1)dzt+1 + mt = y + wtnt + vt + ￿t + at￿1 + mt￿1￿
￿1
t ; (29)
for t ￿ 0, the household chooses c0, n0, m0, a function a0(￿), and contingency plans for the








Here qt(￿), at(￿), y, ￿t and ￿t are de￿ned as in Section 3, wt is the real wage rate, and vt
represents the real value of any pro￿ts distributed by ￿rms to households.
The household optimally sets its consumption of traded and nontraded goods according
to
cTt = !ctPt=PTt (30)
cNt = (1 ￿ !)ctPt=PNt (31)
24cNit = (PNit=PNt)
￿" cNt: (32)
The ￿rst order conditions for nt, mt and at(zt+1) imply that
#n
￿


















where Qt is the price of a domestic nominal bond purchased at date t that pays one unit of
domestic money in all states at date t + 1.
5.2 The Firm￿ s Problem
The nontraded good is produced by monopolistic competitors. For simplicity we assume
that the output of variety i of the nontraded good is simply
xNit = nit; (36)
where nit is the amount of labor hired by the producer of variety i.
We assume that prices are sticky as in Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996), and follow Gal￿
(2008) in our description of the representative ￿rm￿ s problem. At each date ￿rms have a
probability 1￿￿, of being able to change their prices, with drawings independent over time.
As in the Calvo-Yun framework, we assume that ￿rms choose their prices taking the demand
curve for their product as given. Once they set price they satisfy demand by hiring enough
labor to produce a su¢ cient quantity of their product. Suppose that a ￿rm last set its price
at time t, the price it set was ￿ PNt, and it satis￿es demand at this price at all future dates
until able to change its price again.20 Then if it has not changed its price by date t + k, its
pro￿t at date t + k is





where Wt is the nominal wage rate. A ￿rm that is able to choose its price at time t chooses













20We suppress the i subscript from ￿ PNt because all ￿rms who are able to change price choose the same
price.
25where Mt;t+k = ￿
k(ct=ct+k)(Pt=Pt+k), Wt+k, PNt+k, and cNt+k are taken as given for k ￿ 0.21
The ￿
k term re￿ ects the probability of the ￿rm still not having changed its price by date
t + k, while Mt;t+k is the appropriate discount factor given that the ￿rm is owned by the
representative household.
Because the ￿rm￿ s problem is forward looking, and there is no capital in the model, the
optimal decision does not depend on anything speci￿c to the ￿rm. Any ￿rm that is able to



















5.3 Market Clearing Conditions
The world endowment of traded goods is constant and given by y+y￿, so the market clearing
condition for traded goods is
cTt + c
￿
Tt = y + y
￿: (38)
In each country there are market clearing conditions for labor and nontraded goods. In






cNit = xNit, 8i 2 [0;1]: (40)
5.4 Characterizing the Equilibrium




We continue to assume that the money growth rate is given by (13).
Given the laws of motion for domestic and foreign money growth, an equilibrium in our
model is a set of sequences of prices and quantities such that the households in the domestic
economy are maximizing utility subject to their budget constraints (i.e. equations (29)￿ (35)
are satis￿ed), domestic ￿rms make choices consistent with (36) and (37), foreign households
21For symmetry we assume that ￿rms are also overcon￿dent. Under the alternative assumption that ￿rms
have rational expectations, nontraded goods prices would presumably adjust more slowly to in￿ ationary
signals.
26and ￿rms make choices consistent with the foreign analogs of (29)￿ (35), (36) and (37),
and markets clear (i.e. equations (38), (39), (40) and the foreign analogs of the latter two
equations are satis￿ed).
Given the constant global endowment of traded goods, equilibrium consumption of traded
goods in each country is constant across time and states of the world, cTt = cT and c￿
Tt = c￿
T
for all t. We linearize the equilibrium conditions to characterize an approximate solution
to the model. Unfortunately, the model does not have a simple closed form solution as in
the basic model of Section 3. In the appendix, however, we show that the equilibrium of
the model can be characterized by the solution of a ￿rst-order di⁄erence equation in the
deviations of the variables mt, pNt ￿ PNt=PTt, ￿Tt ￿ PTt+1=PTt, and ￿Nt ￿ PNt+1=PNt from
their nonstochastic steady state values. For simplicity, we follow Gal￿ (2008), by solving the
model in the neighborhood of a zero in￿ ation steady state (in our case, in both countries).
So we set ￿ = ￿￿ = 0.
In the basic model the forward premium regression coe¢ cient depended on the semi-
elasticity of money demand, ￿ = 1=(￿i), and the degree of overcon￿dence, ￿. In the expanded
model it depends on these parameters as well as the ￿Calvo parameter,￿￿, the discount
factor, ￿, the share of traded goods in utility, !, and the parameter that determines the
labor supply elasticity, ￿. To illustrate the response of the interest di⁄erential and the
exchange rate to shocks, we set ￿ = 7 and ￿ = 0:3. To calibrate the rest of the parameters
we think of the natural length of a time interval as one quarter. Consistent with the basic
sticky price models illustrated in Gal￿ (2008) we therefore set ￿ = 2=3 and ￿ = 1. We set
￿ = 0:995, consistent with a two percent real interest rate. Finally, we set ! = 0:35.22
Figure 4 illustrates the responses of the domestic interest rate and the exchange rate
to the date-0 arrival of a unit signal about domestic money growth at date 1. As Figure
4 indicates, the behavior of the interest rate and the exchange rate in response to a signal
shock is very similar to that in the basic model. The exchange rate depreciates on impact
and overshoots. Overcon￿dent agents expect the exchange rate to keep depreciating, and
this initially drives the domestic interest rate up.
Three di⁄erences between the expanded model and the basic model are worthy of note.
First, domestic prices do not move one-for-one with the exchange rate. Because nontraded
22This value is approximately consistent with the share of nontraded goods in GDP used by Burnside,
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2006), and is similar to the CPI weight of tradables, 0:4, used by Burstein, Eichen-
baum and Rebelo (2007).
27goods prices are sticky, they initially rise by much less (0:21 percent) than the exchange rate
depreciates (0:47 percent). As time passes, more ￿rms adjust prices so that in the long run
nontraded goods prices on average rise by as much as the exchange rate depreciates. Second,
because of the slow adjustment of nontraded goods prices, the overall price level does not
overshoot its long-run level. Third, on average there is a very small and temporary decline
in the interest rate (relative to the initial steady state) after date 0. This decline in the
interest rate re￿ ects the fact that agents foresee a very slight appreciation of the domestic
currency after date 1. This expected appreciation is driven by the real e⁄ects of the shock.
Sticky prices cause an increase in the demand for nontraded goods, and after the impact
period this has the net e⁄ect that the demand for real money balances rises, causing a slight
appreciation of the exchange rate.
In our calibrated example, the forward premium regression coe¢ cient is ￿1 = ￿1:05,
somewhat higher than the value of ￿1:4 implied by the basic model when ￿ = 7 and ￿ = 0:3.
Figure 5 illustrates the sensitivity of ￿1 to the Calvo price stickiness parameter, ￿, and the
overcon￿dence parameter ￿. The basic model of Section 3 is equivalent to the expanded
model when ￿ = 0.
As before, we ￿nd that the amount of bias in ￿1 is sensitive to the degree of agents￿
overcon￿dence. The amount of bias in ￿1, on the other hand, is not very sensitive to the value
of ￿ for 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:5. Most calibrations of the Calvo parameter assume ￿ ￿ 2=3. Assuming
￿ lies in this range and 0:1 < ￿ < 0:4, we see that the expanded model￿ s quantitative
predictions for the forward premium regression are similar to those of the basic model.
Overall, we conclude that the conclusions we drew from the basic model are not dependent
on the assumption that PPP holds at the level of aggregate consumption.
6 Monetary Policy and Interest Rate Rules
It is arguable that in reality the quantity of money is endogenous, and that monetary policy
determines the nominal interest rate. We therefore modify the extended model of the pre-
vious section by characterizing monetary policy in each country as an interest rate rule.23
Since the money growth rate is endogenous in this setting, we abandon the exogenous law
of motion for money growth given by (13). Having done so, we need to modify the model to
23See, for example, Benigno and Benigno (2003), Clarida, Ga· li and Gertler (2001), Gali and Monacelli
(2005), and McCallum and Nelson (2000).
28incorporate an exogenous source of in￿ ationary shocks that agents receive signals about.
There are many possibilities, but to keep our model as simple as possible we assume that




Here, ￿t is a shock to the production technology. In standard sticky price models, negative
shocks to technology lead to increases in in￿ ation (see Gal￿, 2008). We assume that the law
of motion for ￿t is given by
￿t = ￿t + ut￿1; (43)
where ￿t ￿ N(0;￿2
￿) and ut ￿ N(0;￿2
u) are i.i.d. processes. As we assumed before, at date
t individuals observe a noisy signal about ut, ￿t = ut + ￿t, where ￿t ￿ N(0;￿2
￿) is an i.i.d.
process.
To close the model we assume that monetary policy in the domestic economy is given by
^ {t = ￿i^ {t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿￿E
C
t ^ ￿t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿y^ cNt; (44)
where, as before, ^ {t, ^ ￿t, and ^ cNt represent deviations of the interest rate, the in￿ ation rate,
and the consumption of nontraded goods from their steady state values. Our interest rate
rule has two important features. First, policy makers smooth the path of the interest rate
if ￿i > 0. Second, policy makers are forward looking and set the current interest rate by
responding to agents￿expectations of future in￿ ation and output.24 Our assumption that the
interest rate rule is forward-looking with respect to in￿ ation is consistent with the evidence
provided by Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (1998).
Apart from these changes the model remains the same as the model in the previous
section. We work through the details of the model￿ s solution in the appendix. Importantly, as
with the models studied earlier, without overcon￿dence (￿ = 0) there is no forward premium
bias; ￿1 = 1 regardless of other parameters. In other words, in the model, overcon￿dence is
required to explain the forward premium bias.
To illustrate that the model continues to imply forward premium bias for reasonable
parameterizations, we maintain the calibration of Section 5. We must also specify the para-
meters of the interest rate rule, ￿i, ￿￿ and ￿y. Here we present impulse response functions
24Here, because the endowment of traded goods is assumed to be constant, deviations of output from the
steady state are proportional to deviations of nontraded consumption from the steady state.
29for two calibrations. In the ￿rst calibration we set ￿i = 0:95, ￿￿ = 2, and ￿y = 0:5, values
similar to those estimated by Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (1998) for the Federal Reserve in the
post-1982 period. In the second calibration we set ￿i = 0:95, ￿￿ = 7:5, and ￿y = 0. Here,
the monetary authority responds much more aggressively to in￿ ation and has no concern
with the output gap.
We now illustrate what happens to the economy when agents receive a negative signal
about the level of technology at date 0. Impulse response functions for the ￿rst calibration
are illustrated in Figure 6. In terms of dynamics, this case is quite similar to the one studied
in the previous section (the expanded model with a money growth rule), but with two
exceptions: the interest rate rises persistently in response to the shock, re￿ ecting interest
rate smoothing, and the price level slightly overshoots its long-run level. The model-implied
value of the slope coe¢ cient in the forward premium regression for this case is ￿1 = ￿3:1.
Impulse response functions for the second calibration are illustrated in Figure 7. When
the central bank responds more aggressively to in￿ ationary expectations, as it does in this
case, the exchange rate actually appreciates upon the arrival of the signal. On average
the exchange rate continues to appreciate for one more period, overshooting its long-run
level. Additionally, consumer prices rise immediately in response to the signal. This implies
that in some parameterizations our model is consistent with evidence that in some cases
unanticipated but temporary increases in in￿ ation are associated with short-term exchange
rate appreciation (see, for example, Andersen et. al., 2003 and Clarida and Waldman, 2008).
Intuitively, investors foresee that the central bank will respond to news of high in￿ ation
with aggressive tightening. The model-implied value of the slope coe¢ cient in the forward
premium regression in this case is ￿1 = ￿0:6.
Given the results of the two calibrations, it is clear that the value of the slope coe¢ cient
in the forward premium regression is highly sensitive to the parameterization of the interest
rate rule. To investigate this further we computed ￿1 for a wide range of values of ￿￿
and ￿y. Our results are shown in Figure 8. When the interest rate rule is less aggressive
(￿￿ is smaller), there is more forward premium bias (￿1 is more negative). This empirical
implication of the theory merits further empirical testing. The degree of forward premium
bias is relatively insensitive to ￿y in the range we consider.
We conclude that as long as investors are su¢ ciently overcon￿dent, quantitatively plau-
sible forward premium bias emerges from our model even when monetary policy takes the
30form of an interest rate rule. The model can, at the same time, capture the stylized fact
that unanticipated increases in in￿ ation are associated with exchange rate appreciation in
the short run. In the model this occurs if monetary policy responds aggressively enough to
changes in expected in￿ ation.
7 Concluding Remarks
Motivated by evidence from the psychology of individual judgment, we o⁄er an explanation
for the forward premium puzzle in foreign exchange markets based upon investor overcon￿-
dence. In the model, investors overreact to information about future in￿ ation, which causes
greater overshooting in the forward rate than in the spot rate. Thus, the forward premium
re￿ ects the overreaction in the spot rate and predicts its subsequent correction. The forward
premium bias results when this overreaction-correction e⁄ect dominates the conventional
e⁄ect implied by UIP. The model can explain the magnitude of the forward premium bias,
its greater strength at short time horizons than at long time horizons and in the time series
than in the cross section, and other stylized facts about forward and spot exchange rates
and professional forecasts. Our approach is also consistent with the availability of pro￿table
carry trade strategies.
Our approach suggests some further directions for theoretical and empirical exploration.
First, an important stylized fact about foreign exchange markets is that carry trade returns
are negatively skewed (see, for example, Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen, 2009). Recent
theoretical work on foreign exchange markets (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; and Plantin
and Shin, 2010) shows that liquidity constraints can explain such skewness and ￿ currency
crashes￿owing to the occasional occurrence of a ￿ rush for the exit￿by carry traders. However,
these papers take as given the existence of expected pro￿t opportunities (i.e., the forward
bias) that cause rational investors to become carry traders in the ￿rst place.
Our approach is complementary to these studies in o⁄ering an explanation for forward
bias based upon investor psychology, and therefore an explanation for the existence of the
pro￿t opportunities for rational carry traders. We conjecture that a setting that includes both
rational liquidity-constrained speculators (as in these previous papers) and overcon￿dent
investors (as in ours) can capture skewness as well as the other stylized facts explained by
our model.
There is also evidence that currency crashes are associated with periods of higher volatility
31in foreign exchange markets (see, for example, Clarida, Davis and Pedersen, 2009; and
Menkho⁄, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf, 2010). A possible explanation for periods of high
volatility is that investor con￿dence shifts over time. During periods of high overcon￿dence,
exchange rates should overreact more, thereby increasing the volatility of exchange rates
and carry trade pro￿ts. If, in addition, there are liquidity constraints, this high volatility
can be associated with currency crashes, consistent with the evidence. We view this as an
interesting direction for future research.
Our model implies that the forward premium bias will be more pronounced in periods in
which investors are more overcon￿dent. Previous behavioral ￿nance research suggests that
overcon￿dence-induced overreaction is associated with greater trading volume, high return
volatility, large cross-￿rm valuation dispersion, and strong return momentum and reversals
(at di⁄erent time horizons). This suggests testing whether the forward premium bias is more
pronounced in periods where such variables are high.
Finally, it is interesting to consider whether overcon￿dence explains the ability of the term
structure of domestic interest rates to predict bond returns. The bond pricing literature has
identi￿ed that yield di⁄erentials between long and short-term bonds predict bond returns
(e.g., Fama and Bliss 1987, Campbell and Shiller 1991, Cochrane and Piazzesi 2005). Our
￿nding that overcon￿dence can explain the forward premium puzzle, which also involves
return predictability based upon bond yield di⁄erentials, suggests that overcon￿dence may
o⁄er an integrated explanation of return predictability anomalies in domestic bond markets
as well.
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38TABLE 1: Forward Premium Regressions
Monthly Data, 1983￿ 2008
Forward Horizon, n Sample
1 Month 3 Months 6 Months 1 Year
Australia -0.726 -0.523 -0.529 -0.893 84:12￿ 08:12
(0.686) (0.647) (0.659) (0.602)
Canada -1.047 -0.704 -0.305 -0.233 84:12￿ 08:12
(0.663) (0.610) (0.662) (0.805)
Switzerland -0.634 -1.215 -1.256 -0.880 83:10￿ 08:12
(0.989) (0.986) (1.021) (0.945)
Denmark -0.580 -0.213 -0.448 -0.571 84:12￿ 08:12
(0.677) (0.780) (1.013) (1.039)
UK -2.077 -1.325 -0.750 -0.279 83:10￿ 08:12
(1.088) (1.362) (1.337) (1.134)
Japan -0.511 -2.572 -2.976 -2.906 83:10￿ 08:12
(0.894) (0.956) (0.897) (0.792)
Norway 0.943 0.070 -0.258 -0.348 84:12￿ 08:12
(0.701) (0.743) (0.690) (0.701)
New Zealand -1.146 -0.920 -0.981 -0.918 84:12￿ 08:12
(0.512) (0.431) (0.517) (0.499)
Sweden -0.429 -0.055 -0.073 0.034 84:12￿ 08:12
(0.761) (1.178) (1.262) (1.257)
Singapore -0.864 -0.997 -0.539 -0.625 84:12￿ 08:12
(0.667) (0.562) (0.566) (0.567)
Euro -3.317 -1.782 -2.683 -4.512 99:1￿ 08:12
(2.231) (2.365) (2.194) (1.574)
Average -0.944 -0.930 -0.982 -1.103
Ave. Std. Err. (0.897) (0.965) (0.983) (0.901)
Notes: The table reports estimates of ￿n1 from the regression st+n ￿ st = ￿n0 + ￿n1(fnt ￿
st)+￿t+n, where st is the logarithm of the spot exchange rate, and fnt is the logarithm of the
n-month forward exchange rate, measured in USD per FCU. Heteroskedasticity consistent
standard errors are provided in parentheses. Data source: Datastream BBI end-of-month
exchange rates.
39TABLE 2: McCallum Regressions
Monthly Data, 1983￿ 2008
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4
￿ ￿n R2 ￿ ￿n R2 ￿ ￿n R2 ￿ ￿n R2
Australia 1.086 0.535 1.043 0.710 1.029 0.782 0.995 0.818
(0.077) (0.063) (0.049) (0.039)
Canada 1.041 0.516 1.023 0.688 1.013 0.756 1.031 0.807
(0.073) (0.057) (0.046) (0.043)
Switzerland 1.055 0.511 1.042 0.687 1.030 0.771 1.017 0.818
(0.063) (0.042) (0.036) (0.032)
Denmark 1.068 0.522 1.061 0.703 1.040 0.788 1.021 0.830
(0.062) (0.043) (0.036) (0.031)
UK 1.089 0.535 1.050 0.698 1.044 0.775 1.046 0.825
(0.075) (0.048) (0.041) (0.035)
Japan 1.047 0.512 1.077 0.701 1.059 0.784 1.042 0.829
(0.066) (0.047) (0.034) (0.028)
Norway 1.092 0.547 1.077 0.720 1.049 0.792 1.027 0.826
(0.071) (0.047) (0.038) (0.032)
New Zealand 1.035 0.499 1.009 0.666 1.075 0.772 1.033 0.814
(0.087) (0.057) (0.044) (0.039)
Sweden 1.168 0.578 1.084 0.734 1.066 0.808 1.050 0.847
(0.076) (0.049) (0.035) (0.030)
Singapore 1.046 0.512 1.030 0.687 1.011 0.770 0.980 0.810
(0.075) (0.065) (0.053) (0.049)
Euro 1.201 0.573 1.079 0.719 1.031 0.788 1.001 0.823
(0.088) (0.084) (0.066) (0.060)
Average 1.084 0.531 1.052 0.701 1.041 0.781 1.022 0.822
Ave. Std. Err. (0.074) (0.055) (0.043) (0.038)
Notes: The table reports estimates of ￿ ￿n1 from the regression st+1 ￿ st￿n = ￿ ￿n0 + ￿ ￿n1(ft ￿
st￿n)+￿t+1, where st is the logarithm of the spot exchange rate, and ft is the logarithm of the
one-month forward exchange rate, measured in USD per FCU. Heteroskedasticity consistent
standard errors are provided in parentheses. Data source: Datastream BBI end-of-month
exchange rates. The sample period for each currency is provided in Table 1.
40TABLE 3: Root Mean Squared Error of Exchange Rate Forecasts
(percent) Monthly Data, 1983￿ 2008
Simple Forecasting Rules Regression-based Forecasts
se
t+1 = st + ^ ￿ + ^ ￿xt
se
t+1 = ft se
t+1 = st xt = ft ￿ st xt = ￿ft xt = ￿st
Australia 3.326 3.295 3.289 3.285 3.285
Canada 1.880 1.856 1.848 1.857 1.856
Switzerland 3.414 3.403 3.392 3.395 3.395
Denmark 3.159 3.119 3.103 3.105 3.104
UK 3.068 3.031 3.004 3.021 3.021
Japan 3.327 3.319 3.301 3.306 3.307
Norway 3.096 3.101 3.083 3.091 3.094
New Zealand 3.390 3.273 3.238 3.273 3.272
Sweden 3.206 3.174 3.171 3.133 3.130
Singapore 1.528 1.503 1.487 1.491 1.490
Euro 2.894 2.869 2.826 2.809 2.805
Average 2.935 2.904 2.886 2.888 2.887
Notes: The table reports the root mean squared error (RMSE), in log-percent, of ￿ve fore-
casting rules for the logarithm of the exchange rate. For the simple forecasting rules, the
forecast se
t+1 is set equal to either the log of the one-month forward rate, ft, or the log of
the current spot rate, st. For the regression-based methods we use in-sample forecasts, in
the sense that the regression coe¢ cients used to generate the forecast are estimates based
on the full sample of data. In each case the regression is st+1 ￿ st = ￿ + ￿xt + ￿t+1, and
the forecast is formed as se
t+1 = st + ^ ￿ + ^ ￿xt, where ^ ￿ and ^ ￿ are the estimated coe¢ cients
and xt is the indicated right-hand-side variable. Data source: Datastream BBI end-of-month
exchange rates. The sample period for each currency is provided in Table 1.











Notes: This graph illustrates the average path of movement for the spot and forward ex-
change rates from date ￿1 to date 1 conditional on a date-0 signal about the date-1 money
growth (or in￿ ation) di⁄erential. The ￿gure depicts the case of a positive signal, that is a
rise in domestic money growth relative to foreign money growth at date 1. Paths for the
forward rate are indicated in red, for the spot rate in blue. Paths under rational expectations
are indicated by dashed lines, under overcon￿dence by solid lines. In response to the signal,
under rational expectations, at date 0 the spot and forward exchange rates rise from s = f
to sR
0 and fR
0 , respectively, with fR
0 > sR
0 . At date 1, the average realizations of the two rates
are both ER
0 (s1). When agents are overcon￿dent, at date 0 the spot and forward exchange
rates rise from s = f to s0 > sR
0 and f0 > fR
0 , with f0 > s0. The graph illustrates the
case where the overcon￿dence e⁄ect is strong enough that s0 overshoots its long-run average
level, ER
0 (s1). Thus, a rise in the forward premium predicts a downward correction in the
spot exchange rate.
42FIGURE 2
Dynamic Responses Functions to the Arrival of a Money Growth Signal
(a) Case 1: Investors Have Rational Expectations











































(b) Case 2: Investors are Overcon￿dent











































Notes: The graphs illustrate the paths of the interest rate and exchange rate in response
to the arrival, at time 0, of a positive unit signal of an increase in the money growth rate
di⁄erential. Panel (a) illustrates the case where investors have rational expectations. The
paths are illustrated as deviations from the nonstochastic steady state. Panel (b) illustrates
the case where investors are overcon￿dent. In the exchange rate graphs we illustrate up to
four paths for the exchange rate. The path labeled ￿true signal￿is the path of the exchange
rate if the unit signal, ￿ = 1, corresponds to a realized shock to the money growth rate,
u = 1. The path labeled ￿false signal￿is the path of the exchange rate if the unit signal,
￿ = 1, corresponds to a realized noise shock, ￿ = 1. The path labeled ￿average signal￿is the
average path taken by the exchange rate given the distributions of u and ￿. The path labeled
￿agents￿expectations,￿which is only relevant in the case where investors are overcon￿dent,
is the path overcon￿dent agents expect upon receiving the signal at time 0.
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Notes: The graph illustrates the model-implied value of the slope coe¢ cient ￿1 in the forward
premium regression, st+1 ￿st = ￿0 +￿1(ft ￿st)+￿t+1, where st is the logarithm of the spot
exchange rate, and ft is the logarithm of the one-month forward exchange rate. The value
of ￿1 is 1 ￿ (1 + ￿)￿, where ￿ is the interest rate semi-elasticity of money demand in
the neighborhood of the model￿ s nonstochastic steady state, and ￿ is the parameter that
determines the degree of investor con￿dence.
44FIGURE 4
Dynamic Responses Functions to the Arrival of a Money Growth Signal in
the Expanded Model





















































































Notes: The graphs illustrate the paths implied by the expanded model with nontraded goods
for the interest rate, the exchange rate, in￿ ation rates and prices in response to the arrival,
at time 0, of a positive unit signal of an increase in the money growth rate di⁄erential. The
paths are illustrated as deviations from the nonstochastic steady state.
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Notes: The graph illustrates the expanded model-implied value of the slope coe¢ cient ￿1 in
the forward premium regression, st+1￿st = ￿0+￿1(ft￿st)+￿t+1, where st is the logarithm of
the spot exchange rate, and ft is the logarithm of the one-month forward exchange rate. The
value of ￿1 cannot be characterized in closed form in the expanded model with nontraded
goods. It depends on ￿ and ￿ as well as ￿, the interest rate semi-elasticity of money demand,
￿, the labor supply elasticity parameter, !, the share of traded goods in utility, and ￿, the
discount factor. In Figure 5 we set ￿ = 7, ￿ = 1, ! = 0:35, and ￿ = 0:995.
46FIGURE 6
Dynamic Responses Functions to the Arrival of an Inflationary Signal in
the Expanded Model with an Interest Rate Rule: Benchmark Calibration


















































































Notes: The graphs illustrate the paths implied by the expanded model with an interest-
rate monetary-policy rule for the interest rate, the exchange rate, in￿ ation rates and prices
in response to the arrival, at time 0, of a positive unit signal of a decrease in the future
domestic level of technology. The interest rate rule uses the parameters ￿i = 0:95, ￿￿ = 2,
and ￿y = 0:5. The paths are illustrated as deviations from the nonstochastic steady state.
47FIGURE 7
Dynamic Responses Functions to the Arrival of an Inflationary Signal in
the Expanded Model with an Interest Rate Rule: Alternate Calibration




















































































Notes: The graphs illustrate the paths implied by the expanded model with an interest-
rate monetary-policy rule for the interest rate, the exchange rate, in￿ ation rates and prices
in response to the arrival, at time 0, of a positive unit signal of a decrease in the future
domestic level of technology. The interest rate rule uses the parameters ￿i = 0:95, ￿￿ = 7:5,
and ￿y = 0. The paths are illustrated as deviations from the nonstochastic steady state.
48FIGURE 8
The Slope Coefficient in the Forward Premium Regression in the Expanded































Notes: The graph illustrates the expanded model with interest-rate rule-implied value of the
slope coe¢ cient ￿1 in the forward premium regression, st+1 ￿ st = ￿0 + ￿1(ft ￿ st) + ￿t+1
where st is the logarithm of the spot exchange rate, and ft is the logarithm of the one-
month forward exchange rate. The value of ￿1 cannot be characterized in closed form in
the expanded model. It depends on ￿ and ￿ as well as ￿, the interest rate semi-elasticity
of money demand, ￿, the labor supply elasticity parameter, !, the share of traded goods in
utility, ￿, the discount factor, and the parameters of the interest rate rule, ￿i, ￿￿ and ￿y. In
Figure 8 we set ￿ = 2=3, ￿ = 0:3, ￿ = 7, ￿ = 1, ! = 0:35, ￿ = 0:995, and ￿i = 0:95.
49A Appendix
A.1 Linearization of the Model
We begin by ￿nding the nonstochastic steady state value of m. Setting mt = mt+1 = m and







Taking a ￿rst order Taylor series approximation to (10) in the neighborhood of the nonsto-
chastic steady state we have
0 = ￿￿%m
￿￿c ￿ ^ mt ￿ ￿e
￿￿ ￿ E
C
t ^ ￿t+1 + ￿e
￿￿ ￿ E
C
t ^ mt+1 ￿ ￿e
￿￿ ￿ ^ mt (A2)
where ^ mt ￿ (mt ￿m)=m and ^ ￿t ￿ ￿t ￿￿. Collecting terms and dividing by ￿e￿￿ we obtain
E
C





^ mt = E
C
t ^ ￿t+1 (A3)
Using (A1) we see that %m￿￿c=(￿e￿￿) = 1=(￿e￿￿) ￿ 1 = i. Therefore, using ￿ = 1=(￿i), we
can rewrite (A3) as
E
C





^ mt = E
C
t ^ ￿t+1: (A4)
We can rewrite (11) in terms of the interest rate:
(1 + it)
￿1 = 1 ￿ %m
￿￿
t c: (A5)
Taking a ￿rst order Taylor series approximation to (A5) in the neighborhood of the nonsto-
chastic steady state we have
￿(1 + i)
￿1 ￿^ {t = ￿%m
￿￿c ￿ ^ mt
where ^ {t ￿ dit=(1 + i). Multiplying through by ￿(1 + i) and using the fact that %m￿￿c =
i=(1 + i) we obtain
^ {t = ￿￿i^ mt = ￿^ mt=￿: (A6)
By (12) we have st = lnSt = ln(m￿
t=mt) + ln(Mt=M￿
t ). Thus, to ￿rst order,
st = ln(m
￿=m) + ^ m
￿
t ￿ ^ mt + ln(Mt=M
￿
t ):
Using the solutions for ^ mt and ^ m￿
t given by (16) and (17) gives equation (20). By covered
interest rate parity we have Ft=St = (1 + it)=(1 + i￿
t). The log of the forward premium is
ft ￿ st = ln(1 + it) ￿ ln(1 + i
￿
t):
A1Given (A5), a ￿rst order Taylor series approximation to this equation is
ft ￿ st = ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ +^ {t ￿^ {
￿
t:
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Given the results in Section 3, to ￿rst order,
￿st+1 = ￿ ￿ + ￿￿￿t+1 ￿ ￿
￿￿￿
￿
t+1 + ￿ ￿t+1 + ￿ ut;
and





The covariance of these quantities is
cov(￿st+1;ft ￿ st) = cov[ut ￿ u
￿





















and the variance of the ft ￿ st is









































￿0 = E￿st+1 ￿ ￿1E (ft ￿ st) = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿ ￿:
When there is complete symmetry across the two countries ￿0 = 0 and ￿1 = 1 ￿ ￿(1 + ￿).
A.3 Longer Horizon Regressions




￿￿￿ ￿t+j + ￿ ￿t+j + ￿ ut+j￿1
￿
. Given the baseline as-
sumptions in the main text, EC
t ￿ ￿t+j, EC
t ￿ ￿t+j and EC
t ￿ ut+j￿1 are all zero for j ￿ 2. Hence
fnt￿st = EC
t (st+n ￿ st) = EC
t (st+1 ￿ st) = ft￿st for all n ￿ 2 and st+n￿st is st+1￿st plus
an error orthogonal to time t information. This implies that the coe¢ cient in the forward
premium regression is invariant to the investment horizon.
A2Here we consider an alternative case in which ￿ ￿t is a persistent process, with ￿ ￿t = ￿￿ ￿t￿1+
￿ ￿t, for some 0 < ￿ < 1. We also assume that agents have rational expectations with respect to
￿ ￿t. We maintain the same assumptions, as before, for ￿ ut and ￿ ￿t. With this set of assumptions,




n)￿ ￿t for n ￿ 1:




￿￿ ￿t+[￿=(1￿￿)](1 ￿ ￿n)￿ ￿t plus an error that is orthogonal
to time t information. Hence,






































































st+1 ￿ st￿n = ￿st+1 + st ￿ st￿n
ft ￿ st￿n = ft ￿ st + st ￿ st￿n
￿st+1 = ￿￿￿ ￿t+1 + ￿ ￿t+1 + ￿ ut
ft ￿ st = (￿=￿)￿ ￿t
and




￿ ￿t+1￿j + ￿ ut￿j
￿
:
We denote the slope coe¢ cient in a regression of st+1 ￿ st￿n on ft ￿ st￿n as ￿ ￿n1. The
numerator and denominator of ￿ ￿n1 are
￿ ￿
num
n1 = cov(￿st+1;ft ￿ st) + cov(￿st+1;st ￿ st￿n) + cov(st ￿ st￿n;ft ￿ st) + var(st ￿ st￿n)
￿ ￿
den
n1 = var(ft ￿ st) + 2cov(st ￿ st￿n;ft ￿ st) + var(st ￿ st￿n):
A3With some algebra, we have
￿ ￿
num
n1 = (￿=￿ ￿ ￿ + n)var(￿ u) + ￿
2 var(￿ ￿) + nvar(￿ ￿)
￿ ￿
den







var(￿ ￿) + nvar(￿ ￿);
and we can write
￿ ￿
num
n1 = ￿ ￿
den
n1 + ￿













To get quantitative predictions from the model we proceed as follows. We assume that
the two countries have identical, independent money growth processes. We let ￿ = 0:25,
￿ = 7, and set ￿
R = 0:375. These parameter values imply that ￿
C = 0:5 and ￿ = 0:4375.
The model implies that var(ft￿st) = ￿2 var(￿ ￿)=￿2. Therefore, we set var(￿ ￿) equal to (￿2=￿2)
times the mean of the sample variances of ft ￿ st for our sample of 11 countries. We then
set var(￿ u) = ￿
R var(￿ ￿). Then we note that
var(￿st+1) = 2￿
2 var(￿ ￿) + var(￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ 2￿)var(￿ u)
which implies that
var(￿ ￿) = var(￿st+1) ￿ 2￿
2 var(￿ ￿) + (2￿ ￿ 1)var(￿ u):
We set var(￿st+1) equal to the mean of the sample variances of ￿st+1 for our sample of 11
countries in the above formula to obtain var(￿ ￿). This allows us to calculate ￿ ￿n1.
A.5 Mean Squared Error of Forecasting Rules
For each forecasting rule, we evaluate the mean squared error (MSE).
(i) MSE of the forward premium Regression If the forward premium regression is
used to predict the exchange rate, the forecast error is
e1t+1 = ￿st+1 ￿ [1 ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)](ft ￿ st)




￿ ut ￿ ￿
R￿ ￿t;
which is orthogonal to time t information. The MSE of this forecasting method is
MSE1 = ￿









A4(ii) MSE of a Regression on the Realized In￿ ation Di⁄erential Since PPP holds
in the basic model, the realized in￿ ation di⁄erential is equal to the rate of change of the
exchange rate. That is ￿ ￿t = ￿st. The results are therefore the same as for case (iv), below.
(iii) MSE of a Regression on the Change in the Forward Rate The regression is
of ￿st+1 = ￿￿￿ ￿t+1 + ￿ ut + ￿ ￿t+1 on




C￿ ￿t + ￿ ut￿1 ￿ ￿
C￿ ￿t￿1 + ￿ ￿t










C var(￿ ￿) + ￿
C var(￿ u)
var(￿ft)
The prediction error is
e3t+1 = ￿st+1 ￿ ￿ftb = e1t+1 + ￿1(ft ￿ st) ￿ ￿ftb:
As long as b 6= 0 or ￿1 6= 0, the MSE of e3t+1 exceeds that of e1t+1 because e1t+1 is orthogonal
to lagged information. We can further work out that
e3t+1 = e1t+1 +
￿







b￿ ut￿1 + ￿
Cb￿ ￿t￿1 ￿ b￿ ￿t:
Therefore,
MSE3 = MSE1 +
￿















var(￿ ￿) + b
2 var(￿ ￿):
(iv) MSE of a Regression on the Change in the Spot Rate The regression is of








￿￿2 var(￿ ￿) + ￿var(￿ u)
var(￿st)
The prediction error is
e4t+1 = ￿st+1 ￿ ￿stb = e1t+1 + ￿1(ft ￿ st) ￿ ￿stb:
As long as b 6= 0 or ￿1 6= 0, the MSE of e4t+1 exceeds that of e1t+1 because e1t+1 is orthogonal
to lagged information. We can further work out that
e4t+1 = e1t+1 + [￿1 (￿=￿) ￿ ￿b]￿ ￿t + (￿ ￿ 1)b￿ ut￿1 + ￿b￿ ￿t￿1 ￿ b￿ ￿t:
A5Therefore,
MSE4 = MSE1 + [￿1 (￿=￿) ￿ ￿b]
2 var(￿ ￿) +
[(￿ ￿ 1)b]
2 var(￿ u) + (￿b)
2 var(￿ ￿) + b
2 var(￿ ￿):
(v) MSE of the Forward Rate In this case the forecast error is
e5t+1 = ￿st+1 ￿ (ft ￿ st) = e1t+1 ￿ ￿(1 + ￿)(ft ￿ st):
The MSE is
MSE5 = MSE1 + [￿(1 + ￿)]
2 var(ft ￿ st)
= MSE1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)
2 var(ft ￿ st)
since ft ￿ st is orthogonal to e1t+1. As long as ￿1 6= 1 the forward premium regression
dominates the forward rate as a predictor.
(vi) MSE of the Spot Rate In this case the forecast error is
e6t+1 = ￿st+1 = e1t+1 + ￿1(ft ￿ st)
The MSE is
MSE6 = MSE1 + ￿
2
1 var(ft ￿ st);
since ft ￿ st is orthogonal to e1t+1. As long as ￿1 6= 0 the forward premium regression
dominates the spot rate as a predictor.
A.6 Solving the Expanded Model
To solve the model we de￿ne the following variables pXt ￿ Pt=PTt, wXt ￿ Wt=PTt, pNt ￿
PNt=PTt and ￿Tt ￿ PTt=PTt￿1. Using the fact that cTt = cT for all t, and these newly de￿ned













A6We use (A8) to eliminate cNt from the other optimality conditions.
The demand function for each variety, (32), combined with the market clearing condition







Since we solve the model in the neighborhood of a zero in￿ ation steady state, the integral in
equation (A9) is equal to 1 up to a ￿rst order approximation. To see this, consider equation




exp[(1 ￿ ")zit]di; (A10)
where zit ￿ ln(PNit=PNt). In the neighborhood of a zero in￿ ation steady state in which
zi = 0 for all t, up to a ￿rst order approximation equation (A10) implies






0 zitdi ￿ 0. The integral in equation (A9) is equal to
R 1
0 exp(￿"zit)di, which to
￿rst order is equal to 1￿"
R 1
0 zitdi ￿ 1.25 Therefore, up to ￿rst order we rewrite (A9), using
(A8), as






We use (A8) to eliminate nt from the other optimality conditions.
Using the de￿nition of aggregate consumption, (26), (A8), and (A11) the optimality










We use (A8) to eliminate wt from the other optimality conditions.
Substituting out ct using (26), and cNt using (A8) the household￿ s ￿rst order condition














To a ￿rst order approximation (A13) is
￿i^ mt = i(! ￿ 1)^ pNt ￿ E
C
t ^ ￿Tt+1 (A14)
25An equivalent derivation is provided by Gal￿ (2008).
A7where ^ mt ￿ (mt ￿ m)=m, ^ pNt ￿ (pNt ￿ pN)=pN, ^ ￿Tt ￿ ￿Tt ￿ 1 and i ￿ ￿
￿1 ￿ 1.
Since Mt=Mt￿1 = exp(￿t) it follows that mtpXt￿Tt=(mt￿1pXt￿1) = exp(￿t). Substituting





Nt￿1=mt￿1 = exp(￿t): (A15)
To a ￿rst order approximation (A15) is













To a ￿rst order approximation (A17) is
^ ￿Nt = ^ pNt + ^ ￿Tt ￿ ^ pNt￿1: (A18)
Now consider the nontraded producing ￿rm￿ s ￿rst order condition, (37). To simplify this
condition we follow Gal￿ (2008). Multiplying (37) through by
￿ ￿ PNt=PTt￿1
￿

























Using the de￿nitions ￿ ￿Nt ￿ ￿ PNt=PNt￿1, wXt ￿ Wt=PTt, and ￿T





































where ~ ￿Nt = ￿ ￿Nt ￿1, ^ pNt = (pNt ￿pN)=pN, ^ wXt = (wXt ￿wX)=wX and ^ ￿T
t￿1;k = ￿T
t￿1;k ￿1.











k ^ ￿Tt+k=(1 ￿ ￿￿) where ^ ￿Tt = ￿Tt ￿ 1. Therefore, equation
(A19) may be written as












t ^ ￿Tt+k (A20)
A8Written as a di⁄erence equation, (A20) is equivalent to
~ ￿Nt + ^ pNt￿1 = ￿￿E
C
t (~ ￿Nt+1 + ^ pNt) + (1 ￿ ￿￿)^ wXt + ^ ￿Tt: (A21)
To proceed further we now derive an expression for ~ ￿Nt using (27). Any ￿rm that is set-
ting its price has price ￿ PNt because all ￿rms setting price at time t have the same ￿rst
order condition. Denoting the set of ￿rms who are not changing price as St, we can write
PNt =
h


























￿1=(1￿"). So then we have ￿Nt =
￿




or where ￿Nt = PNt=PNt￿1. Linearized this is ^ ￿Nt = (1 ￿ ￿)~ ￿Nt, where ^ ￿Nt = ￿Nt ￿ 1. So
we rewrite (A21) as
^ ￿Nt +(1￿￿)^ pNt￿1 = ￿￿E
C
t ^ ￿Nt+1 +(1￿￿)￿￿^ pNt +(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)^ wXt +(1￿￿)^ ￿Tt: (A22)
Since wXt = (Wt=PTt) it follows that wXt = (Wt=Pt)(Pt=PTt) = wtpXt and ^ wXt = ^ wt + ^ pXt.
Hence, using (A7) and (A12) we have ^ wXt = ^ wt + ^ pXt = ￿￿^ pNt. This allows us to write
(A22) as
^ ￿Nt + (1 ￿ ￿)^ pNt￿1 = ￿￿E
C
t ^ ￿Nt+1 + ￿N^ pNt + (1 ￿ ￿)^ ￿Tt; (A23)
where ￿N = (1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿].
The four equations (A14), (A16), (A18), and (A23), represent a ￿rst order linear di⁄er-
ence equation in the variables ^ ￿Nt, ^ pNt, ^ ￿Tt and ^ mt, with ￿t being exogenous. From here, we















+ ￿2￿t + ￿3￿t: (A24)
where ￿1 is a 4 ￿ 2 matrix of coe¢ cients, while ￿2 and ￿3 are 4 ￿1 vectors. Further details
of the solution procedure are available from the authors.
The price of a domestic bond is given by equation (35). Combining this equation with
(34) we obtain Qt = 1 ￿ %m
￿￿
t ct. Substituting out ct using (26), and cNt using (A8) this
becomes









To solve for the interest rate in the domestic economy we linearize (A25):
^ {t = ￿ ^ Qt = ￿￿i^ mt + i(! ￿ 1)^ pNt: (A26)
A9We can solve for the interest rate in the foreign economy in the same way. >From the
PPP condition for traded goods, the rate of depreciation of the domestic currency is ^ ￿t+1 =
^ ￿Tt+1￿^ ￿
￿
Tt+1. Given the linear solution for ^ mt, ^ pNt, ^ ￿Tt and ^ ￿Nt provided by equation (A24),
it is straightforward to compute the probability limits of the regression coe¢ cients discussed
in Section 4, either analytically or by simulation.
A.7 Solving the Model with an Interest Rate Rule
The equilibrium conditions of the model, as in the previous case, reduce to four equations.
Equations (A14) and (A18) are unchanged. Equation (A16) is dropped because the money
growth rate is endogenous. It is replaced by (44). Finally, equation (A23) is modi￿ed to
take into account the fact that the ￿rm￿ s marginal cost now depends on the stochastic level
of technology:
^ ￿Nt + (1 ￿ ￿)^ pNt￿1 = ￿￿E
C
t ^ ￿Nt+1 + ￿N^ pNt ￿ ￿￿￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)^ ￿Tt; (A27)
where ￿￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 + ￿).
Since (A8) and (A26) still hold, the interest rate rule can be rewritten as
￿￿i^ mt +
￿
i(! ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ ￿i)￿y
￿
^ pNt = ￿i [￿￿i^ mt￿1 + i(! ￿ 1)^ pNt￿1] +
(1 ￿ ￿i)￿￿E
C
t [!^ ￿Tt+1 + (1 ￿ !)^ ￿Nt+1]:(A28)
Equations (A14), (A18), (A27) and (A28), represent a ￿rst order linear di⁄erence equation
in the variables ^ ￿Nt, ^ pNt, ^ ￿Tt and ^ mt, with ￿t being exogenous. As in the previous section,
it is then straightforward to solve the model using the method of King, Plosser and Rebelo
(2002). Once again, the solution takes the form (A24) with the matrices ￿i i = 1, 2, 3, being
di⁄erent nonlinear functions of the deep parameters than in the previous model. Further
details of the solution procedure are available from the authors.
A10